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Abstract
Following a line of research initiated in [4], I describe a general framework for
turning reduction concepts of relative computability into diagrams forming an
analogy with the Cichon´ diagram for cardinal characteristics of the continuum. I
show that working from relatively modest assumptions about a notion of reduction,
one can construct a robust version of such a diagram. As an application, I define
and investigate the Cichon´ Diagram for degrees of constructibility relative to a
fixed inner modelW . Many analogies hold with the classical theory as well as some
surprising differences. Along the way I introduce a new axiom stating, roughly,
that the constructibility diagram is as complex as possible1.
1 Introduction
In [4] an analogue of the Cichon´ diagram was developed for highness properties of Turing
degrees. In this paper I show that the framework set up in [4] is very flexible and can
be used to produce a wide variety of Cichon´ Diagrams for various reductions related to
various notions of computability. Expanding upon this more general viewpoint I show
that such diagrams exist for many of the standard reduction concepts on the reals. In
each case I obtain an analogue of (a large fragment of) the Cichon´ diagram. As an
example, I show how such a diagram can be constructed and studied for degrees of
constructibility relative to some inner model W alongside the corresponding reduction
≤W . I also indicate how such diagrams could be constructed in other contexts, though
I leave the details to future projects.
1This reasearch was supported by a CUNY mathematics fellowship and the author would like to
thank the mathematics department at the Graduate Center at CUNY for this. The author would also
like to express his gratitude to Professor Joel David Hamkins for his patient, enthusiastic and thoughtful
help and encouragement as well as Professors Gunter Fuchs and Alfred Dolich for sitting on the author’s
oral exam committee where a version of this material was originally presented and Professor Jo¨rg Brendle
for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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∅ B≤W (∈
∗)
B≤W (≤
∗)
B≤W ( 6=
∗)
D≤W ( 6=
∗)
D≤W (≤
∗)
D≤W (∈
∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
Figure 1: The Cichon´ diagram for ≤W
Let W be a transitive inner model of ZFC. Recall that for reals x and y (in V ) the
relation x ≤W y is defined by x ∈ W [y]. The following theorem, which I formalize in
GBC, is the first of two main theorems I prove.
Main Theorem 1. For any transitive inner model W of ZFC, the inclusions shown in
the Cichon´ diagram for ≤W (Figure 1) all hold. Furthermore, the diagram is complete
in the sense that there is a forcing extension showing that no other implications are
necessarily true.
In fact I show more: for a wide variety of computability-like notions alongside their
corresponding reduction concepts one can construct a Cichon´ diagram similar to the one
pictured above. In the case of ≤W the theory and corresponding diagram are robust in
that they interact very well with regards to the familiar forcings to add reals that one
studies for the classical Cichon´ diagram. Moreover by a simple forcing over the inner
model W the diagram can be saturated in the sense that all possible separations can be
realized simultaneously and this can be done in such a way that is indestructible with
respect to further forcing. This is the second main theorem of this paper.
Main Theorem 2. There is a model of ZFC realizing simultaneously all possible sepa-
rations between nodes of the Cichon´ diagram for ≤W . Moreover, no further forcing over
this model can destroy this property.
I dub the statement that “all possible separations of the ≤W Cichon´ diagram are
realized”, CD(≤W ). The paper finishes by briefly treating CD(≤W ) as an axiom.
2 Generalized Cichon´ Diagrams for Reductions
In this section I expand on the general viewpoint of computable reduction concepts as
giving rise to Cichon´ diagrams. Underlying the construction of such Cichon´ diagrams
for reduction concepts is a certain perspective on cardinal characteristics of the contin-
uum. To describe this perspective better, let us think of cardinal characteristics of the
continuum in terms of small and large sets relative to some relation giving this notion
of smallness and largeness. For example, recall that the binary relation ≤∗ is defined
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on ωω as f ≤∗ g if and only if for all but finitely many n ∈ ω, f(n) ≤ g(n). A family
reals A is (≤∗) -unbounded if for all f ∈ ωω there is some g ∈ A such that g ∗ f . The
smallest cardinality of an unbounded family is called the unbounding number, denoted
b = b(≤∗). Dually, a family of reals A ⊆ ωω is (≤∗) -dominating if for all g ∈ ωω there is
a f ∈ A such that g ≤∗ f . The least size of a dominating family is called the dominating
number, denoted d = d(≤∗). Intuitively one thinks of bounded families as being “small”
and dominating families as being “big”. Thus, heuristically one might think of b as the
least size of a set that’s not “small” and d as the least size of a set that’s “big”. To obtain
an analogy in the computable world, the authors of [4] define B(≤∗) as the set of oracles
computing a function f such that g ≤∗ f for each computable function g and D(≤∗)
as the set of oracles computing a function f such that f ∗ g for all computable g. In
other words B(≤∗) is the set of oracles which can compute a witness to the fact that the
computable functions are “small” and D(≤∗) is the set of oracles which can compute a
witness to the fact that the computable functions are not “big”. Moreover, these sets
turn out to correspond to “highness” properties of Turing degrees that are well studied
in computability theory. Specifically, by a theorem of Martin (cf [4, pp. 3]), B(≤∗) is
the set of high degrees and, by definition, D(≤∗) is the set of hyperimmune degrees.
My key observation is that this formalism has nothing to do with Turing computabil-
ity per se. This motivates the following general definition.
Definition 2.1. A reduction concept is a triple (X,⊑, x0) where X is a nonempty set,
x0 ∈ X is some distinguished element and ⊑ is a partial pre-order on X . If X is given
or implicit, we also say that the pair (⊑, x0) is a reduction concept on X . If (X,⊑, x0)
is a reduction concept, then for x, y ∈ X say that x is ⊑-reducible to y if x ⊑ y and say
that x is ⊑-basic if it is ⊑-reducible to x0.
Let (⊑, x0) be a reduction concept on X and R ⊆ X ×X be a binary relation. Let
⊑↾ x0 = {y ∈ X | y ⊑ x0} be the basic reals. Then define the bounding set for R as
B⊑(R) = {x ∈ X | ∃y ⊑ x ∀z ∈⊑↾ x0 [zRy]}
and the non-dominating set for R as
D⊑(R) = {x ∈ X | ∃y ⊑ x ∀z ∈⊑↾ x0 [¬yRz]}.
Roughly, if ⊑ is some sort of relative computability relation, then B⊑(R) is the set
of elements of x ∈ X which compute an R-bound on the computable elements of X
and D⊑(R) is the set of x ∈ X which compute an element which is not R-dominated
by the set of all computable elements. If R is a relation giving a notion of “small” and
“big” sets as described above one can think of B⊑(R) as the set of elements computing
a witness to the fact that the ⊑-basic sets are small and D⊑(R) as the set of elements
computing a witness to the fact that the ⊑-basic elements are not big.
Example 2.2 ([4]). Let x0 ∈ ωω be some computable real, say the constant function
at x0. Then the pair (≤T , x0) forms a reduction concept on the reals. The basic reals
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are the computable reals. For any binary relation R on the reals B≤T (R) is the set of
Turing degrees computing an element of X which R-bounds all the computable sets.
Similarly D≤T (R) is the set of Turing degrees computing an element of X which is not
R-dominated by any computable set.
The next example will be the central focus of the rest of this article.
Example 2.3. Let x0 ∈ ω
ω be constructible. Then the pair (≤L, x0) is a reduction
concept on ωω where x ≤L y if x ∈ L[y]. The basic reals are the constructible reals.
More generally, fix some inner model W ⊆ V and let ≤W be constructibility relative
to W . Then if 0 ∈ (ωω)W is any given real in W the pair (≤W , x0) forms a reduction
concept on Baire space and the basic reals are those of W . Since this is the main case
let me explicit what the bounding and non-dominating sets are. Let R be a relation
on the reals of V . The set B≤W (R) consists of all reals x in V such that in W [x] there
is an R-bound on the reals of W . Similarly the set D≤W (R) consists of all reals x in
V such that in W [x] there is a real which is not R-bounded by any real in W . For
example, B≤W (≤
∗) is the set of dominating reals over W in V and D≤W (≤
∗) is the set
of unbounded reals over W in V .
I will come back to this example in the next section. First, let me give some more
examples of reduction concepts on the reals, though I will not treat them in detail in
this article.
Example 2.4. Recall that the relation of many-one polytime reduction, ≤pm is defined
by x ≤pm y if and only if there is a function f which is computable in polynomial time
such that n ∈ x if and only if f(n) ∈ y. The pair (≤pM , ∅) is a reduction concept on
P(N).
Example 2.5. Let κ > ω be an uncountable cardinal. Recently there has been much
work in the descriptive set theory of “generalized” Baire and Cantor spaces, κκ and 2κ,
including various generalizations of cardinal characteristics of the continuum. The same
can be done in my framework for degrees of constructibility. For instance notions of
eventual domination, etc all make sense in the general context of κκ and corresponding
bounding and non-dominating sets can be constructed over the basic elements, (κκ)L.
The framework described above is flexible enough that (X,⊑, x0) need not be some
actual notion of computability on the reals nor have an explicit relation to cardinal
characteristics of the continuum. For instance one might consider a class of models of
a fixed theory in a fixed language with embeddibility. In this case, depending on the
relations R one studied, one would arrive at a diagram corresponding to when models
with certain properties embed into one another. There are many possibilities, each
giving a potentially interesting diagram of inclusions between the various bounding and
non-dominating sets for an appropriate collection of relations. In future work I hope to
explore all of these more fully.
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Presently however, let me restrict my attention to the types of cases described in the
preceding examples. To see how these examples can lead to “Cichon´ diagrams” let me
define some relations.
Definition 2.6 (Combinatorial relations). I consider the reals as elements of Baire space,
ωω. Let f, g be reals. Then
1. f 6=∗ g if there is some k such that for all l > k f(l) 6= g(l). In this case say that g
is eventually not equal to f . Note that the negation of 6=∗ is infinitely often equal,
not eventual equality.
2. Let h ∈ ωω and recall that an h-slalom is a function σ : ω → [ω]<ω such that for
all n ∈ ω the set |σ(n)| ≤ h(n). In the case where h is the identity function call σ
simply a slalom. For a slalom σ, I write f ∈∗ σ if there is some k such that for all
l > k f(l) ∈ σ(l). In this case say that f is eventually captured by σ.
Even in this general framework I can now prove a collection of implications giving a
version of the Cichon´ diagram.
Theorem 2.7. Let (⊑, x0) be a reduction concept on ωω extending ≤T such that if
f, g ⊑ h then f ◦ g ⊑ h then, interpreting arrows as inclusions, the following all hold:
∅ B⊑(∈∗)
B⊑(≤∗)
B⊑( 6=∗)
D⊑( 6=∗)
D⊑(≤∗)
D⊑(∈∗) ωω \ {x | x ⊑ 0}
Figure 2: A Cichon´ diagram for an arbitrary reduction concept on Baire space
Proof. Note that slaloms can be computably coded by reals so, since the relation ⊑
extends Turing computability the ∈∗ can be seen as a relation on the reals. I drop the
⊑ subscript for readability. Also, I’ll write “basic” for ⊑-basic and if y ⊑ x then I’ll say
that “x builds y”. The requirement that ⊑ be closed downwards under compositions
will be used implicitly throughout the argument where I will show that a function can
build two other functions hence it can build their composition.
All but two cases are essentially immediate from the definitions. These easy cases
are pictured in Figure 3.For example, consider B(∈∗) ⊆ B(≤∗). This says that every x
building a slalom eventually capturing all the basic reals builds a real which eventually
dominates all basic reals. This is proved as follows. Suppose x ∈ B(∈∗) and let σ ⊑ x
be a slalom witnessing this. Then, define z(n) = max (σ(n)) + 1. Notice that z ≤T σ so
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∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ {x | x ⊑ 0}
Figure 3: The easy cases
z ⊑ σ and hence z ⊑ x. Moreover, since σ eventually captures all basic reals, z must
eventually dominate them all so x ∈ B(≤∗). The other easy cases are similarly shown.
The two more substantive inclusions are B(∈∗) ⊆ D( 6=∗) and B( 6=∗) ⊆ D(∈∗). Let’s
start with B(∈∗) ⊆ D( 6=∗). Substantively this states that if a real x builds a slalom
eventually capturing all basic functions then x also builds a real which is infinitely-
often-equal to all basic functions. In fact I will show a more general claim that implies
this. The following lemma and proof is essentially a reinterpretation of Theorem 1.5
from [1].
Lemma 2.8. For any real x the following are equivalent.
1. There is a real g ⊑ x such that for all basic f ∈ ωω, there exist infinitely many
n ∈ ω such that g(n) = f(n)
2. There is a basic h ∈ ωω and an h-slalom σ ⊑ x such that for all basic f ∈ ωω there
are infinitely many n ∈ ω such that f(n) ∈ σ(n).
Moreover, given an infinitely-often-equal real as in 1), one can build from it an h-slalom
as in 2) and given an h-slalom σ as in 2) one can build an infinitely-often-equal real as
in 1). Thus, x ∈ D( 6=∗) if and only if there is a basic h ∈ ωω and an h-slalom which
captures each of the basic reals infinitely often.
Before proving Lemma 2.8, notice that it implies the inclusion B(∈∗) ⊆ D( 6=∗) since
any slalom which captures every basic real cofinitely often must in particular capture
each basic real infinitely often so if x ∈ B(∈∗) builds such a slalom, by the lemma x must
be able to build an infinitely-often-equal real as well.
Proof of Lemma 2.8. The forward direction is obvious: suppose that g is an infinitely-
often-equal real. Then clearly the 1-slalom φ : ω → [ω]1 such that φ(n) = {g(n)} is
≤T -computable from g and hence ⊑-reducible to g, thus giving the desired h-slalom.
For the backward direction fix a basic real h such that there exists an h-slalom as in
the statement of 2. I need to find a real g which is infinitely often equal to every basic
real. In a basic fashion, fix a family of finite, nonempty, pairwise disjoint subsets of ω
enumerated {Jn,k | n < ω & k ≤ h(n)} which collectively cover ω. Since h is assumed
to be basic there is no problem building such a partition, for example one could use
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singletons. Label Jn =
⋃
k≤h(n) Jn,k. Then for each basic f ∈ ω
ω let f ′ : ω → ω<ω be the
function defined by f ′(n) = f ↾ Jn. More generally let J = {f : ω → ω<ω | dom(f(n)) =
Jn}. Notice that the basic elements of J are exactly {f ′ | f ∈ ωω & f ⊑ 0} since from
any f ′ we can build f and vice versa (by the the fact that the Jn’s are basic). But now
since the f ′’s are basic and each one codes a real one can by applying 2 plus some simple
coding to find an h-slalom, σ : ω → (ω<ω)<ω such that for every n ∈ ω |σ(n)| ≤ h(n)
and σ(n) is a set of finite partial functions from Jn to ω and for every basic f
′ ∈ J there
are infinitely many n ∈ ω such that f ′(n) ∈ σ(n).
Let me denote σ(n) = {wn1 , ..., w
n
h(n)}. Now set gn =
⋃
k≤h(n)w
n
k ↾ Jn,k and let
g =
⋃
n<ω gn. Notice that this gives an element of ω
ω since the Jn,k’s were disjoint and
collectively covered ω. I claim that g is as needed. Clearly g is reducible to the Jn,k’s,
which are basic, and the wnk ’s, which are reducible to σ so g is reducible to σ. It remains
to see that it is an infinitely-often-equal real. To see this, let f ∈ ωω be basic and fix some
n such that f ′(n) ∈ φ(n) (recall that there are infinitely many such n). Notice that since
f ′(n) ∈ φ(n) there must be some k ≤ h(n) such that f ↾ Jm = wnk . Now let xn ∈ Jn,k
(recall that this set is assumed to be non-empty). We have that f(xn) = w
n
k (xn) = g(xn).
But there are infinitely many such n and hence infinitely many such xn so this completes
the proof.
A similar proof produces the last inclusion, B( 6=∗) ⊆ D(∈∗). In words this inclusion
states that any real which can build a real which is eventually different from all basic
reals can build a real which is not eventually captured by any given slalom. I will prove
the following more general lemma, whose statement and proof is inspired by [1], Theorem
2.2. Given an h-slalom σ and a function f let me say that f is eventually never captured
by σ if there is some k such that for all l > k f(l) /∈ σ(l).
Lemma 2.9. For any real f , the following are equivalent.
1. The real f is eventually different from all basic reals.
2. The real f is such that for all basic reals h and all basic h-slaloms σ for all but
finitely many n ∈ ω f(n) /∈ σ(n).
Therefore x ∈ B( 6=∗) if and only if x builds a real which is eventually never captured by
any basic h-slalom for any basic h.
Let me note before I prove Lemma 2.9 that it proves the inclusion B( 6=∗) ⊆ D(∈∗)
and hence Theorem 2.7. To see why, suppose that x ∈ B( 6=∗) and, without loss of
generality suppose that x itself is a real which is eventually different from all basic reals.
Then by the lemma x is eventually never captured by any basic slalom so, in particular
for infinitely many n x(n) /∈ σ(n) for all basic σ, which means x ∈ D(∈∗).
Proof of Lemma 2.9. Fix some f ∈ ωω. The backward direction of this lemma is easy:
if f is eventually never captured by any basic h-slalom for any basic h then in particular
it is eventually never captured by the slalom sending n 7→ {g(n)} for each basic g and
hence it is eventually different from each basic g.
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For the forward direction, assume f is eventually different from all basic functions.
Fix a basic h and, like in the proof of Lemma 2.8, in a basic fashion partition ω into finite,
disjoint, non-empty sets {Jn,k | k ≤ h(n)}. Let Jn =
⋃
k≤h(n) Jn,k. Let f
′ : ω → ω<ω be
the function defined by f ′(n) = f ↾ Jn. Then if σ is any basic h-slalom, let σ
′ be such that
on input n gives h(n) many finite partial fuctions wn1 , ..., w
n
h(n) with domain Jn where for
all k ≤ h(n) and l ∈ Jn wnk (l) is the k
th greatest number in the set σ(l) if such exists and
0 (say) otherwise. Suppose now towards a contradiction that there is a basic h-slalom
σ such that f(n) ∈ σ(n) for infinitely many n. For each n let σ′(n) = {wn1 , ..., w
n
h(n)}.
Then define gn =
⋃
k≤h(n)w
n
k ↾ Jn,k and let g =
⋃
n<ω gn. Clearly g can built using σ,
the function h and the Jn,k’s each of which is basic so g is basic. Thus there is a k such
that for all n > k we have that f(n) 6= g(n). But, since there are infinitely many n such
that f(n) ∈ σ(n), there are infinitely many n > k such that f(n) ∈ σ(n) and therefore
it follows that similarly we must have that there are infinitely many n > k such that
f ′(n) agrees with some wnj on some element of their shared domain for some j ≤ h(n).
But this means f(k) = g(k) for some k ∈ Jn,j for infinitely many n’s and j’s which is a
contradiction.
Since this was the final inclusion to prove, Theorem 2.7 is now proved as well.
Thus, even in this broad context one can construct diagrams for a wide variety of
reduction concepts and a correspondence starts to form with the Cichon´ diagram. This
extends the proof given in the case of Turing degrees in [4] and gives a good framework
for investigations into various computability reduction concepts. What it does not show,
however, is that any of these nodes are non-empty or that the inclusions are strict.
Indeed this is not necessarily the case. For instance B≤T (∈
∗) = B≤T ( 6=
∗) (see [4]). This
is because, by a theorem of Rupprecht, the set B≤T (∈
∗) is simply the high reals, which
as I mentioned above is also B(≤∗). The analogue of this fact in the case of the classical
Cichon´ diagram is false since add(N ), the analogue of B≤T (∈
∗), can consistently be
less than b, the analogue of B(≤∗). The authors of [4] take this as evidence that the
≤T -Cichon´ diagram provides “only an analogy, not a full duality” [4, p. 3] with the
classical Cichon´ diagram. Theorem 2.7 proves the existence of a wide variety of such
diagrams, therefore raising the question in each case of how strong the analogy between
the reduction diagram and the classical diagram is, and whether we ever get a full duality.
This depends on the strength of the reduction since, while the ≤T diagram gives only
an analogy, I show in the next section that in the ≤W diagram the inclusions proved in
Theorem 2.7 constitute the only ones true in every model of ZFC, thereby suggesting
something closer to a true duality.
3 Separations in the ≤W -Cichon´ Diagram
From now on fix an inner model W . I work in the language of set theory with an
extra predicate for W and the theory ZFC(W ), that is ZFC with replacement and
comprehension holding for formulas containing W . I view W = L as a central case
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but it turns out that the analysis works out the same for arbitrary W . In this section I
will be primarily concerned with separations in the diagram, that is forcing to make the
inclusions described above proper for the ≤W reduction concept.
Note that all of the implications discussed in the previous section hold when in
the case of the ≤W reduction concept. For reference, let me state clearly what the
unbounding and dominating sets are for the combinatorial relations defined in the last
section for ≤W .
1. B(∈∗) is the set of reals x such that there is a slalom σ ∈ W [x] that eventually
captures all reals in W .
2. B(≤∗) is the set of reals x such that there is a real y ∈ W [x] that eventually
dominates all reals in W . Such y are called dominating reals (for W ).
3. B( 6=∗) is the set of reals x such that there is a real y ∈ W [x] that is eventually
different from all reals in W . Such y are called eventually different reals (for W ).
4. D(∈∗) is the set of reals x such that there is a real y ∈ W [x] that is not eventually
captured by any slalom in W .
5. D(≤∗) is the set of reals x such that there is a real y ∈ W [x] that is not eventually
dominated by any real in W . Such y are called unbounded reals (for W ).
6. D( 6=∗) is the set of reals x such that there is a real y ∈ W [x] that is equal infinitely
often to every real in W . Such y are called infinitely-often-equal reals (for W ).
In this section I will study how a variety of known forcing notions over W can create
separations in the ≤W -Cichon´ diagram as described in the previous section. Of course
ZFC(W ) cannot prove any separations since if V = W or, more generally V and W have
the same reals, every node in the ≤W -diagram will be empty. However, using simple
forcings I will show that one can produce a wide variety of possible constellations for the
≤W -diagram. Each of these, with the exception of perhaps the LOC forcing is standard
but the collection of facts together will be useful in the final section. The main theorem
of this section is the following.
Theorem 3.1. The Cichon´ diagram for ≤W as described in the previous section is
complete for ZFC(W )-provable implications. In other words if A and B are two nodes
in the diagram and there is not an arrow from A to B in the ≤W -diagram then there is
a forcing extension of W where A * B. Moreover, every single cut, that is two valued
split, can be realized by a proper forcing.
Let me note one word on the relation between my diagram and the standard Cichon´
diagram as commonly studied, for example in [2]. Here I have focused on the so-called
combinatorial nodes as discussed by [4]. As noted in the introduction I view this dia-
gram in correspondence with the classical one via the mapping sending unbounded or
dominating families with respect to a certain relation to the sets of reals x such that in
9
ℵ1 add(N )
b
non(M)
cov(M)
d
cof(N ) 2ℵ0
Figure 4: The Combinatorial Nodes of the Standard Cichon´ Diagram
W [x] the reals of W are not unbounded or dominating. I have included this fragment of
the Cichon´ diagram to make this analogy clear visually.
The details of these correspondences for ≤T can be found in [4] and similar ideas
hold in the present case. In a planned sequel [11] I will treat the mising nodes, namely
those corresponding to invariants of measure and category. Note however, that the
analogy holds between the combinatorial characterizations of the cardinal invariants,
not their usual definitions. For example, add(N ) is known to be equal to b(∈∗) and
it is this cardinal that corresponds to B(∈∗). In particular, add(M), cof(M), non(N )
and cov(N ) are missing since they lack combinatorial characterizations in terms of the
relations 6=∗, ≤∗ and ∈∗. In the aforementioned sequel they will be treated.
3.1 Sacks Forcing
The first forcing I will look at is Sacks forcing, S. Recall that conditions in S are perfect
trees T ⊆ 2<ω ordered by inclusion. If G is S-generic then the unique branch in the
intersection of all members of G is called a Sacks real. I denote such a real s.
Theorem 3.2. In the Sacks extension all nodes of ≤W -Cichon´ diagram other than ωω \
(ωω)W are empty.
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
Figure 5: After Sacks forcing
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Proof. Recall that Sacks forcing enjoys the Sacks property, by Lemma 7.3.2 of [2]. How-
ever the Sacks property translated into the language of this article is simply the statement
that no new real is in D(∈∗).
3.2 Cohen Forcing
Let C = Add(ω, 1) be the forcing to add one Cohen real. The following theorem is
essentially standard:
Theorem 3.3. Let c be a Cohen real generic over W . Then in W [c] the following hold:
1. ∅ = B(∈∗) = B(≤∗) = B( 6=∗)
2. D( 6=∗) = D(≤∗) = D(∈∗) = {x | ∃c ∈ W [x] Cohen over W} = ωω \ (ωω)W
Thus, the full diagram for Cohen Forcing is:
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
Figure 6: After Cohen forcing
Proof. Cohen forcing does not make the ground model reals meager, [3, p. 83], so no
eventually different real is added. At the same time, every Cohen real is an infinitely often
equal real and by Theorem 3.3.1 of [2] every subforcing of Cohen forcing is isomorphic
to Cohen forcing so if x is new then in W [x] there is a real d which is Cohen generic over
W , and d is infinitely often equal to every real in W so x ∈ D( 6=∗).
3.3 Hechler Forcing
Let D be Hechler forcing and let d be the associated dominating real. Recall that
conditions of D are pairs (p,F) where p is a finite partial function from ω to ω and F
is a finite family of elements of ωω. The order is given by (q,G) ≤D (p,F) if and only if
q ⊇ p, G ⊇ F and for all n ∈ dom(q) \ dom(p) and all f ∈ F , q(n) > f(n). Note that
since d is dominating, d ∈ B(≤∗).
Theorem 3.4. After Hechler forcing over W the ≤W -diagram has
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1. ∅ = B(∈∗),
2. B(≤∗) = B( 6=∗) and
3. D( 6=∗) = D(≤∗) = D(∈∗) = ωω \ (ωω)W .
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
Figure 7: After Hechler forcing
Proof. There are three things to observe: first that Hechler forcing does not add an
eventually different real that is not dominating, second that it does not add a slalom
eventually capturing all ground model reals and the third is that every subforcing of
Hechler forcing adds an infinitely often equal real. The first of these is Corollary 13 of
[5]. The second is well known, see for example Theorem 3.6 of [9]. The third follows from
[10, Theorem 8.1] which states that every subforcing of Hechler forcing adds a Cohen
real.
3.4 Eventually Different Forcing
Let E be eventually different forcing, which is defined like D except that stems of exten-
sions need simply be eventually different from the reals in the second component, not
dominating. I will show that:
Theorem 3.5. Assume that every set of reals in L(R) has the Baire property (this is
implied by sufficiently large cardinals). Let e be an E-generic real over W . Then in W [e]
the following hold:
1. B(∈∗) = B(≤∗) = ∅,
2. B( 6=∗) ( D( 6=∗) = D(≤∗) = D(∈∗) = ωω \ (ωω)W .
Thus in particular the full diagram for eventually different forcing is as shown in Figure
7.
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∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
Figure 8: After Eventually Different forcing
This is proved in a way exactly analogous to Hechler forcing noting that E does not
add a dominating real (see [2, p. 385]) and, assuming the large cardinal hypothesis,
Palumbo’s result stating that every subforcing of E adds a Cohen real.
Lemma 3.6. Assume that every set of reals in L(R) has the property of Baire. Then
in every nontrivial intermediate model between W and W [e] there is a real c which is
C-generic over W .
A proof of this is sketched in [10, pg 38] for D but the reader will notice that it goes
through equally well for E. Indeed the centerpiece of the argument involves a fact, due to
Shelah and Gitik [6, Proposition 4.3] that given any sufficiently well-defined σ-centered
forcing P, if certain filters of P in L(R) have the property of Baire, then P will add
a Cohen real. It is not hard to see from the combination of the Gitik-Shelah and the
Palumbo arguments that “sufficiently well defined” includes all subforcings of E. Thus,
assuming all sets of reals have the property of Baire the result goes through.
Using this lemma, by the same argument given for D, we have the proof of Theorem
3.5.
The use of large cardinals here is unfortunate and I hope it can be improved on.
The result for D (that avoids large cardinals) uses the tree version of Hechler forcing
and I do not know of an analogous one for E. Let me note however that even without
large cardinals I have shown that there is a model realizing the cut determined by
B(∈∗) = B( 6=∗) = ∅.
3.5 Random Real Forcing
I denote random real forcing by B. The diagram for random real forcing is as described
in the theorem below.
Theorem 3.7. Let r be a random real over W . Then in W [r] the ≤W -Cichon´ diagram
is determined by the separations B(∈∗) = B(≤∗) = D( 6=∗) = D(≤∗) = ∅ and B( 6=∗) =
D(∈∗) = ωω \ (ωω)W .
13
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
Figure 9: After Random Real forcing
The proof of this theorem follows from the following list of facts that are well known
and can be found in [2], Chapter 3.
Fact 3.8. The random real forcing B
1. Adds no unbounded reals,
2. Adds an eventually different real and
3. If x ∈ W [r] ∩ ωω \W ∩ ωω then there is a real which is random over W in W [x].
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Since by 1 of Fact 3.8, B adds no unbounded reals D(≤∗) is empty.
Now, suppose x ∈ W [r] \W , then there is a y ≤W x which is also random over W by 3
of Fact 3.8. Thus by 2 of Fact 3.8 we get that x ∈ B( 6=∗). Therefore ωω \ (ωω)W ⊆ B( 6=∗)
and the result follows.
3.6 Localization Forcing
In this section I study Localization forcing, the forcing to add a generic slalom capturing
all ground model reals.
Definition 3.9 (Localization Forcing (cf [5])). The localization forcing LOC is defined
as the set of pairs (s,F) such that s ∈ ([ω]<ω)<ω is a finite sequence with |s(n)| ≤ n for
all n < |s| and F is a a finite family of functions in Baire space with |F| ≤ |s|. The
order is (t,G) ≤LOC (s,F) if and only if t ⊇ s, G ⊇ F and f(n) ∈ t(n) for all f ∈ F and
all n ∈ |t| \ |s|. We think of the first component as a finite approximation to a slalom
we are trying to build and as such I will often refer to the length of the sequence as its
“domain” and write dom(s).
Unfortunately I do not have a full characterization of the diagram in the case of LOC.
The following theorem summarizes the state of knowledge.
14
Theorem 3.10. Let σ be a slalom which is LOC-generic over W . Then in W [σ] all
the nodes in the diagram are non-empty and we have that B(∈∗) is a proper subset of
B(≤∗) and D( 6=∗). Also B(≤∗) ( B( 6=∗) and D(≤∗) ( D(∈∗). In particular, Figure 9 is
a partial diagram for LOC.
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
?
?
Figure 10: Partial diagram after Localization forcing
Proving this theorem amounts to showing that LOC adds B, D and E generics. I
start with D. Notice first that LOC adds a dominating real. Indeed if σ is a generic
slalom in W LOC then d(n) := max σ(n) has this property. This is actually a Hechler
real:
Lemma 3.11. Let σ ∈ W LOC be a generic slalom eventually capturing all ground model
reals. Then, d(n) := max σ(n) is D-generic over W .
To prove this I will need a simplified version of D: in the first component of a condition
I will assume that the domain is a finite initial segment of ω and instead of having the
second component of a condition of D be a finite family of functions, it will be a single
function. Then (q, g) ≤D (p, f) if and only if q extends p, for all n ∈ dom(q) \ dom(p),
q(n) ≥ f(n) and for all n ∈ ω, and g(n) ≥ f(n). It’s not hard to see that this version of
D is forcing equivalent to the original one I defined.
Proof. Recall that a projection π : P → Q between two posets is an order preserving
map which sends the maximal element of P to the maximal element of Q and for all
p ∈ P and all q ≤ π(p) there is some p ≤ p such that π(p) ≤ q. If a projection exists
between P and Q then the image π′′G of a P-generic filter generates a Q-generic filter.
Therefore to prove the lemma it suffices to show that the map π : LOC → D such that
π(s,F) = (n 7→ max s(n),ΣF) where ΣF is the pointwise sum, is a projection. To see
why, note that if (s,F) ∈ LOC and let, for all n ∈ dom(s), p(n) = max s(n) and let
f = ΣF . Since F is finite this is well defined. Then the pair (p, f) is a D condition and
the union of all conditions such defined from elements of the LOC generic defining σ is
the d from the statement of the lemma.
It is routine to check that π(1LOC) = 1D and that the map π is order preserving. The
difficulty is in verifying the third condition of projections. To this end, let (s,F) ∈ LOC
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and let (p, f) = π(s,F). Let (p′, f ′) ≤ (p, f) and let D ⊆ D be a set of conditions
which is dense below (p′, f ′). It suffices to find a strengthening (t,G) of (s,F), such that
(n 7→ max t(n),ΣG) ∈ D. To do this, first, find a function g : ω → ω such that for all
n /∈ dom(p), g(n) > n+ f and otherwise is at least as big as f . Then, (p, g) strengthens
(p, f) and is compatible with (p′, f ′). Let (q, h) ∈ D strengthen (p, g).
Now, we can build our new LOC condition. DefineH : ω → ω byH(n) = h(n)−f(n).
Notice that since g(n) was assumed to be bigger than f(n) for all n and h(n) ≥ g(n)
since it is a strengthening it follows that H is in fact always positive. Moreover, f +H =
ΣF + H = h. It remains to show that there is a t ⊇ s such that dom(t) = dom(q),
for all n ∈ dom(t), max t(n) = q(n) and for all n ∈ dom(t) \ dom(s) and all f ∈ F ,
f(n) ∈ t(n). Once this has been done (t,F ∪ {H}) will be the desired condition. I
claim that this is all possible. I will describe a t extending s be defined on the domain
of q (by construction, the domain of q contains that of s). Without loss of generality
|dom(q)| > |dom(s)|+ 2. Thus, the domain of t will be large enough to accomodate the
side condition F ∪{H}. Let |F| = k and enumerate F = {f0, ..., fk−1}. Note that k < n
for all n ∈ dom(q) \ dom(s). Now, for each n ∈ dom(q) \ dom(s), let me define t(n).
Notice first that one must put in all k numbers {f0(n), ..., fk−1(n)} and we also want
max t(n) = q(n) so add this in too. Since n > k, one needs to simply add n − k − 1
additional numbers {j0, ..., jn−k−2} such that each one is less than q(n) and different
from all numbers in the set {f0(n), ..., fk−1(n), q(n)}. This is possible however, since by
construction q(n) ≥ g(n) for all n /∈ dom(p) and g(n) > n + Σi<kfi(n) on this domain.
Thus, there must be at least n between the maximum of the fi(n)’s and q(n), which is
more than we needed.
Now, I show that LOC adds an E-generic real. This fact was first told to me (without
proof) in private communication with J. Brendle. I thank him for pointing it out to me.
Lemma 3.12. The forcing LOC adds an E-generic real.
Proof. Given a condition (s,F) ∈ LOC define a stem for an E-condition as ps : dom(s)→
ω by letting for all n ∈ dom(s) ps(n) be equal to the kth natural number m not in the set
s(n) where the pointwise sum Σs(n) ≡ k mod n. We claim that the map π : LOC → E
defined by π(s,F) = (ps,F) is a projection. Clearly the maximal condition is sent to
the maximal condition and this map is order preserving. Let (s,F) ∈ LOC, and let
(q,G) ≤E (ps,F). We need to show that there is a strengthening of (q,G) in the image
of π. To this end, note that we can assume with out loss that |G| < dom(q) since
otherwise we can strengthen to make this true. Now, define a partial slalom as follows:
sq : dom(q) → [ω]<ω. For n ∈ dom(p) let sq(n) = s(n). For n /∈ dom(p) let q(n) = m
and suppose that m is the kth not in {f(n) | f ∈ F} and suppose that this set has size
l < n (the < follows from the fact that (p,F) is in the image of π). Then, pick n − l
numbers ml, ml+1, ..., mn−1 all greater than every f(n) for f ∈ F and not equal to m so
that Σf∈{f(n) + Σ
n−1
i=l mi ≡ k mod n. This can be accomplished, for instance, as follows:
if Σf∈Ff(n) ≡ j mod n then let ml ≡ k− j mod n greater than all the f(n)’s and let all
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other mi’s be multiples of n. Finally let sq(n) = {f(n) | f ∈ F} ∪ {ml, ..., mn−1}. Then
(sq,G) ≤ (s,F) and π(sq,G) = (q,G) as needed.
Finally,
Lemma 3.13. Any forcing adding a slalom eventually capturing all ground model reals
adds a random real. In particular LOC adds a random real.
Proof. By Corollary 3.2 of [9] adding a slalom eventually capturing all ground model
reals is equivalent to adding a Borel null set which covers all Borel null sets coded in
the ground model. Let N ⊆ ωω be such a null set and let y /∈ N . Then y is not in any
ground model null set so y is a random real.
Combining all of these results then proves Theorem 3.10 since both D and E add
Cohen reals realizing the split down the middle in Figure 10 and B adds a bounded real
not caught in any old slalom so D(≤∗) is strictly contained in D(∈∗).
As an aside notice that there seem to be other eventually different reals added by
LOC:
Observation 3.14. Let σ ∈ W LOC be a generic slalom eventually capturing all ground
model reals. Let a(n) be defined as the least k /∈ σ(n). Then a is a real which is eventually
different from all ground model reals but is not an E-generic real.
Proof. First notice that the a described in the theorem is in fact eventually different
from all ground model reals since every real eventually is captured by σ and after that
point a is different from it. Moreover, notice that a is not only not dominating over
the ground model reals but actually not even unbounded since, given any real f ∈ W
growing faster than the identity (n 7→ n + 2 even), the least k not in σ(n) must be less
than f(n) since |σ(n)| = n. From this it follows that a is not an E-generic since it is not
unbounded.
This lemma is somewhat surprising and indeed I do not know exactly what the forcing
adding the real a is or if it is a previously studied notion. In particular, I don’t know if
this real is random over W , though I conjecture that it is.
3.7 Laver Forcing
Let me now turn to Laver forcing, L. Recall that conditions in Laver forcing are trees
T ⊆ ω<ω with a distinguished stem, that is, a linearly ordered initial segment, after
which there is infinite branching at each node. The order is inclusion. The union of the
stems of the trees in a generic for L form a real, called a Laver real. Let l denote such a
real over W . Recall that l is dominating. The main theorem of this section is
Theorem 3.15. Let l be a Laver real over W . Then the ≤W diagram in W [l] has
∅ = B(∈∗) = D( 6=∗) and all other nodes are equal to the set of all new reals.
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∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
Figure 11: After Laver forcing
Proof. Clearly l is dominating. Also by [7, Theorem 7]) Laver reals satisfy the following
minimality property: if x is a real such that x ∈ W [l] \W then l ∈ W [x]. Finally L
does not add any reals in D( 6=∗)2.This is true because, by Theorem 7.3.29 of [2] L that it
satisfies what is known as the Laver property (see [2, Definition 6.3.27]) which states that
any real in the extension W [l] which is bounded by a ground model real can eventually
be captured in an h-slalom for any real h ∈ W whose lim sup is infinity. The Laver
property in turn implies there are no infinitely often equal reals added. As a result,
D( 6=∗) is empy but every new real adds the dominating real l.
3.8 Rational Perfect Tree Forcing
The last forcing notion I look at is Miller’s rational perfect tree forcing, PT. Recall that
PT is the set of perfect trees T ⊆ ω<ω so that for all s ∈ T there is a t ⊇ s with ω-many
immediate successors. The order is inclusion and the unique branch through the trees
in the generic is called a Miller real. Let us denote such a real by m.
Theorem 3.16. Let m be a Miller real over W . Then the ≤W diagram in W [m] is
determined by ∅ = B( 6=∗) = D( 6=∗) and all other nodes are equal to the set of all new
reals.
Proof. There are three things to show: that PT adds no eventually different reals, that
PT adds no infinitely often equal reals, that every subforcing of PT adds an unbounded
real. All of these are standard facts about PT. The fact that PT adds no eventually
different real follows immediately from [2, Theorem 7.3.46, Part 1]. The proof that PT
adds no infinitely often equal real is the same as for Laver forcing as PT also enjoys the
Laver property ([2, Theorem 7.3.45]). That m is unbounded is clear from the definition
of the forcing and so, to finish the theorem it suffices to show that m is of minimal
degree. This follows directly from [7, Theorem 3].
2I would like to thank Professor Martin Goldstern who explained this fact to me on Mathoverflow,
https://mathoverflow.net/questions/287977/does-laver-forcing-add-an-infinitely-often-equal-real .
18
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
Figure 12: After rational perfect forcing
3.9 Cuts in the Diagram and the Analogy with Cardinal Char-
acteristics
Let me finish this section by noting that it follows from what I have shown that the
ZFC(W )-provable subset implications implied by Theorem 2.7 are the only ones. In other
words, Theorem 3.1 is proved. Indeed a simply inspection of the diagrams above show
that every implication shown in Figure 1 is consistently strict and no other implications
are true in every V extending W . This shows also that the analogue discussed in the
previous section holds in a robust way with the traditional Cichon´ diagram. In fact, we
can actually show that a stronger fact is true.
Theorem 3.17. All cuts consistent with the diagram are consistent with ZFC(W ) in
the following sense: Given any collection N of (not ∅)-nodes in the diagram which are
closed upwards under ⊆ there is a proper forcing P in W so that forcing with P over
W results in all and only the nodes in N being nonempty. See Figure 13 for a pictoral
representation
Note that this is slightly weaker than the sense of cuts I have been considering above
since I’m making no distinction between various non-empty nodes after forcing.
Proof. There are two cuts I have yet to explicitly show. These correspond to e) and i)
in Figure 13 below. However for completeness let me go through all cuts one at a time.
a) All nodes are non empty: This is accomplished by LOC.
b) All nodes except B(∈∗) are non empty: This is accomplished by D.
c) All nodes below B(≤∗) are empty and D( 6=∗) is empty: This is accomplished by L.
d) All nodes below B( 6=∗) are empty and D( 6=∗) is non empty: This is accomplished by
E.
e) All nodes below D(≤∗) are empty and B( 6=∗) is non empty: This is the first case where
we still have to prove something. Let P = B∗ P˙T. I claim that in W P this cut is realized.
We have seen that forcing with B adds an eventually different real and, by further forcing
with PT over W B will add a real which is unbounded by W B ∩ ωω and hence W ∩ ωω.
It remains therefore to see that in W P there are no dominating or infinitely often equal
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∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
a) All nodes non empty
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
j) All nodes empty except ωω \ (ωω)W
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
i) All nodes below D(∈∗) empty
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
h) All nodes below D(∈∗) except B( 6=∗) are empty
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
f) All nodes below D(≤∗) empty and B( 6=∗) empty
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
e) All nodes below D(≤∗) empty and B( 6=∗) non empty
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
g) All nodes below D( 6=∗) empty and B( 6=∗) empty
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
d) All nodes below B( 6=∗) empty and D( 6=∗) non empty
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
c) All nodes below B(≤∗) empty, D( 6=∗) empty
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
b) All nodes except B(∈∗) non empty
Figure 13: All Possible Cuts in the ≤W Cichon´ Diagram. Each one can be achieved by
a proper forcing over W . White means that the node is not empty while yellow means
that it is. No distinction is made between different non-empty nodes. Note that the
trivial cut where all nodes remain empty is not shown.
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reals over W . To show that there are no dominating reals, note that in general PT adds
no dominating real, so in W P there is no real which is dominating over W B. But, since
B is ωω-bounding, it follows that there is no real dominating over W in W P. To show
there are no infinitely often equal reals, let us first note the following fact.
Fact 3.18 (Corollary 2.5.2 of [2]). Suppose M |= ZFC. Then M ∩ 2ω ∈ N if and only
if there is a sequence 〈Fn ⊆ 2n | n < ω〉 such that Σ∞n=0|Fn|2
−n < ∞ and for every
x ∈M ∩ 2ω there are infinitely many n so that x ↾ n ∈ Fn.
As a corollary of this Fact, notice that adding an infinitely often equal real on ωω
makes the ground model reals measure 0. To see why, suppose g ∈ ωω is infinitely often
equal over an inner modelM and let 〈τk | k < ω〉 be an enumeration inM of the elements
of 2<ω. Then for every x ∈ 2ω ∩M let xˆ : ω → ω be defined by xˆ(n) = k if x ↾ n = k.
Clearly if x ∈ M the xˆ ∈ M so there are infinitely many n such that xˆ(n) = g(n). But
then, pulling back, let g′ : ω → 2<ω be defined by g′(n) = σk if g(n) = k and σk ∈ 2n
and is trivial otherwise. Then we have that for every x ∈ M ∩ 2ω if xˆ(n) = g(n) then
x ↾ n = g′(n) so the sequence 〈{g′(n)} | n < ω〉 witnesses that 2ω ∩M is measure 0 by
the Fact.
From this it follows immediately that P does not add infinitely often equal reals since
both B ([2, Lemma 6.3.12]) and PT ([2, Theorem 7.3.47]) preserve outer measure.
f) All nodes below D(≤∗) are empty and B( 6=∗) is empty: This is accomplished by PT.
g) All nodes below D( 6=∗) are empty and B( 6=∗) is empty: This is accomplished by C.
h) All nodes below D(∈∗) except B( 6=∗) are empty: This is accomplished by B.
i) All nodes below D(∈∗) are empty: This is the second cut where we still have something
to prove. To achieve this one we force with the infinitely often equal forcing EE as defined
in [2, Definition 7.4.11]. This forcing is ωω-bounding so it doesn’t add reals to D(≤∗),
does not make the ground model reals meager (both of these facts are proved as part of
[2, Lemma 7.4.14]) so it doesn’t add reals to B( 6=∗) and generically adds a real which is
infinitely often equal to all ground model elements of the product space Πn<ω2
n. Let’s
see that EE adds a real to D(∈∗). Recall that this means there is a real which is not
eventually captured by any ground model slalom. Let g : ω → 2<ω be the infinitely
often equal real added by the generic and fix an enumeration 〈τn | n < ω〉 (in W ) of
2<ω. Let gˆ : ω → ω be the function defined by gˆ(n) = k if g(n) = τk. I claim that this
gˆ is as needed. To see why, let σ ∈ W be a slalom. We can associate (in W ) a function
fσ : ω → 2<ω by letting fσ(n) be τk where k is the least so that k /∈ σ(n) and τk ∈ 2n.
Note that such a k exists since |σ(n)| = n. Since fσ ∈ W there are infinitely many n so
that fσ(n) = g(n). Therefore there are infinitely many n so that gˆ(n) /∈ σ(n), as needed.
j) All nodes except ωω \ (ωω)W are empty: This is accomplished by S.
k) All nodes are empty: This one is not pictured in Figure 13 since it is trivial. Let P
be any forcing not adding reals, such as trivial forcing.
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4 Achieving a Full Separation in the ≤W -Cichon´ Di-
agram and the axiom CD(≤W )
In this section building off the work done in the last section I build a model where there
is complete separation between all elements in the diagram.
Theorem 4.1. (GBC) Given any transitive inner model W of ZFC, there is a proper
forcing notion P, such that in W P all the nodes in the ≤W -Cichon´ diagram are distinct
and every possibile separation is simultaneously realized.
∅ B(∈∗)
B(≤∗)
B( 6=∗)
D( 6=∗)
D(≤∗)
D(∈∗) ωω \ (ωω)W
Figure 14: Full Separation of the ≤W -diagram
In what follows I call the axiom “All consistent separations of the ≤W -diagram are
distinct” CD(≤W ) or “full Cichon´ Diagram for ≤W”. Thus the above theorem states
that CD(≤W ) can be forced over W by a proper forcing. For different inner models W
the sentence CD(≤W ) may vary but they can all be forced the same way.
Before proving this theorem I need a simple technical result about Sacks and Laver
forcing.
Lemma 4.2. The product forcing S× L satisfies Axiom A and hence is proper.
Proof. Theorem 1 of [7] gives a general framework for showing that certain arboreal
forcings satisfy Axiom A (including Sacks and Laver forcings) and here I adapt the proof
to the case of a product of two arboreal forcings. Recall that if p, q ∈ S and n ∈ ω then
we let q ≤Sn p if and only if q ⊆ p and every n
th splitting node of q is an nth splitting
node of p i.e. if τ ∈ q is a splitting node with n splitting predecessors in q then the same
is true of τ in p. Also, given a canonical enumeration of ω<ω in which σ appears before
τ if σ ⊆ τ and σ⌢k appears before σ⌢(k + 1) then for p ∈ L one gets an enumeration
of the elements of p above the stem, σp1 , ..., σ
p
k, ... and if p, q ∈ L and n ∈ ω then let
q ≤Ln p if and only if q ⊆ p and s
p
i = s
q
i for all i = 0, ..., n. Clearly if for every n ∈ ω and
(ps, pl), (qs, ql) ∈ S× L we let (qs, ql) ≤n (ps, pl) if and only if qs ≤Sn ps and ql ≤
L
n sl then
this satisfies the first requirement of Axiom A forcings. Thus, it remains to show that
for every S× L-name a˙ and condition (ps, pl) ∈ S× L if (ps, pl)  a˙ ∈ Vˇ then for every
n there is a (qs, ql) and a countable set A ∈ V such that (qs, ql)  a˙ ∈ A.
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Fix such a name a˙ and condition p = (ps, pl). Let D ⊆ S × L be the set of all
(qs, ql) ≤ p such that there is some a(q) ∈ V with (qs, ql)  ˇa(q) = a˙. This set is dense
below p since p forces a˙ to be an element of V . LetHD ⊆ p be the set of all pairs (σ, τ) ∈ p
such that there is a (σ′, τ ′) ⊆ (σ, τ) with σ′ n-splitting in ps and τ ′ n-splitting in pl and
there is some rσ,τ = (rs, rl) ≤ p in D whose stem (i.e. the pair of the stems from the two
components) is (σ, τ). Finally let Min(HD) be the set of (σ, τ) ∈ HD which are minimal
with respect to inclusion. Note that Min(HD) is an antichain since no two elements can
be comparable and both minimal. Let r = (rs, rl) =
⋃
{rσ,τ | (σ, τ) ∈ Min(HD)}. A
routine check shows that the set r is a condition in S× L and r ≤n p.
Now let A = {a(rτ,σ) | (σ, τ) ∈ Min(HD)}. This set is countable thus to finish the
lemma it suffices to show that r  a˙ ∈ Aˇ. To see this, suppose that t ≤ r and t  a˙ = aˇ
for some a. By extending t if necessary one may assume that the stem of t is in HD.
But then some initial segment of the stem is in Min(HD) so a ∈ A, as needed.
Now I prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. This essentially follows from the theorems of the previous section.
Given a definable forcing notion Q let me write QW for the version of that forcing notion
as computed in W . Let P = SW × LW × LOCW . Then in W P not every new real is in
an element of the diagram since Sacks reals were added. Moreover, by our arguments
above the combination of LOC and L will add reals to every node of the diagram but,
none of them will be equal and moreover every possible non-separation is realized as one
observes by my previous arguments.
It remains to see that P is proper. This follows from Lemma 4.2 plus the fact that
LOC is σ-linked and hence indestructibly ccc.
Let me finish this paper by briefly studying the axiom CD(≤W ). First, let me show
that there are other ways to obtain it. Indeed there is another, less finegrained approach
to forcing CD(≤W ). To describe this, let me make the following simple observation.
Recall that the Maximality Principle MP of [8] states that any statement which is
forceably necessary or can be forced to be true in such as a way that it cannot become
later forced to be false, is already true. If Γ is a class of forcings then the maximality
principle for Γ, MPΓ, states the same but only with respect to forcings in Γ.
Proposition 4.3. The axiom CD(≤W ) is forceably necessary, that is once it has been
forced to be true it will remain so in any further forcing extension. Thus in particular it
is implied by the maximality principle, MP .
Proof. This is more or less immediate from the definition. Since CD(≤W ) is defined
relative to a fixed inner model and the diagram forW concerns only the modelsW [x] for
x ∈ ωω ∩ V , notice that forcing over V cannot change the theories of the models W [x]
for x ∈ V hence if CD(≤W ) is true in V it must remain so in any forcing extension. In
other words absoluteness for membership in each of the various classes holds and this
guarentees that forcing cannot change the relation x ∈ A for any node A of the diagram.
Since CD(≤W ) is forceably necessary it follows that MP implies CD(≤W ).
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Now notice that since all the forcing notions used in Theorem 4.1 have size at most
2ℵ0 it follows that the collapse forcing Coll(ω,< (22
ℵ0 )+) will add a generic making
CD(≤W ) true. Since CD(≤W ) is forceably necessary it follows that the full collapse
forcing cannot kill the generic once it is added and, as a result one obtains
Corollary 4.4. WColl(ω,<(2
2ℵ0 )+) |= CD(≤W )
Moreover, note that while the forcing described in Theorem 4.1 was proper and hence
preserved ω1 the collapse forcing used above is not. Therefore the following is immediate.
Corollary 4.5. The statement “the reals of W are countable” is independent of the
theory ZFC(W ) + CD(≤W ).
Since CD(≤W ) is forceably necessary and hence cannot be killed once it is forced
to be true it follows that any sentence which can be forced to be true from any model
must be consistent with CD(≤W ). Such examples include CH , 2ℵ0 = κ for any κ
of uncountable cofinality, Martin’s Axiom and its negation, ♦ and its negation, and a
wide variety of forcings associated with the classical Cichon´’s diagram. In particular,
CD(≤W ) is independent of any consistent assignment of cardinals to the nodes in the
Cichon´ diagram (cf [2] for a variety of examples of such).
Let me finish now by showing the consistency of a strong version of CD(≤W ), which
was suggested to me by Gunter Fuchs. The idea is to iteratively force with the forcing P
of Theorem 4.1 for long enough that a large collection of inner modelsW simultaneously
satisfy CD(≤W ).
Theorem 4.6. Assume V = L. Then there is an ℵ2-c.c. proper forcing extension where
2ℵ0 = ℵ2 and for every ℵ1-sized set of reals A there is a set of reals B ⊇ A of size ℵ1 so
that CD(≤W ) holds for W = L[B].
Proof. Assume V = L and let ~P = 〈(Pα, Q˙α) | α < ω2〉 be an ω2-length countable
support iteration of copies of the forcing P from Theorem 4.1 (i.e. Q˙α+1 evaluates to
(P)L
Pα
). Clearly ~P is proper. Moreover, since CH holds in the ground model and the
forcing P is easily seen to be of size continuum, and does not kill CH it follows that ~P
has the ℵ2-c.c. and every intermediate stage in the iteration preserves CH: LPα |= CH
for all α < ω2. However, since reals are added at every stage the final model satisfies
2ℵ0 = ℵ2.
It remains to show that for every ℵ1-sized set of reals A there is a set of reals B ⊇ A
of size ℵ1 so that CD(≤W ) holds for W = L[B]. Let A be a set of reals of size ℵ1. Then,
there is some α so that A ∈ L[Gα] for Gα be Pα-generic. Note that we can code Gα by
a set of reals of size at most ℵ1, say B, and without loss we can assume that A ⊆ B for
L[Gα] = L[B]. Then at stage Pα+1 we added a generic witnessing that CD(≤L[B]) holds.
Moreover, by the fact that this statement is forceably necessary, it cannot be killed by
the tail end of the iteration so it holds in the final model.
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While it is not entirely clear what consequences we can expect from CD(≤W ) for an
arbitraryW , the stronger version obtained in Theorem 4.6 has several low hanging fruits
in this regard. Let me pluck a particularly simple one connecting the constructibility
diagram to the standard Cichon´ diagram.
Lemma 4.7. Assume for every ℵ1-sized set of reals A there is a set of reals B ⊇ A
of size ℵ1 so that CD(≤W ) holds for W = L[B]. Then all the cardinals in the Cichon´
diagram have size at least ℵ2.
Proof. It suffices to show that add(N ) ≥ ℵ2. Towards this goal, recall Bartoszyn´ski’s
characterization of add(N ) as the least cardinal κ so that there is a set of reals X of size
κ so that no single slalom can capture all the reals in X ([3, Theorem 5.14]). The result is
then immediate for, given any set of reals A of size ℵ1, we can find a set B ⊇ A of size ℵ1
and a slalom σ eventually capturing all reals in L[B] by CD(≤L[B]) so add(N ) > ℵ1.
5 Open Questions
I finish by collecting the open questions that have appeared throughout this paper. First
I ask about the Cichon´ diagram for other reduction concepts. Recall that in the case of
≤T , the sets B(∈∗) and B(≤∗) were equal.
Question 1. What strength is required from a reduction (x0,⊑) on the reals so that
B⊑(∈∗) ( B⊑(≤∗)? In particular, can one achieve this with ≤A?
Next I ask about the ZFC(W )-provable relations between the nodes of the ≤W -Cichon´
diagram. While I have shown that there are no other implications it is entirely possible
that there are other relations more generally.
Question 2. What other ZFC(W )-provable relations are there between the sets in?
My next collection of questions concerns the subforcings of LOC, a topic that deserves
more study.
Question 3. What is the forcing adding the eventually different real described in Lemma
3.14? Does it add a dominating real? Note that it must be ccc, in fact σ-linked and add
eventually different reals which are bounded by nearly all ground model reals.
Similarly, one might ask whether there is a similarly exotic subforcing of LOC for
adding a dominating real.
Question 4. Does every subforcing of LOC adding a dominating real add a D-generic
real?
Question 5. Does every subforcing of LOC add a Cohen real or a random real?
Finally I conclude with some questions about the axiom CD(≤W ).
Question 6. What statements are implied by CD(≤W )? In particular, does it imply that
there are W -generics for the forcings to add reals we have discussed (Cohen, random,
etc)?
Question 7. How does CD(≤W ) relate to standard forcing axioms? In particular does
MAℵ1 imply CD(≤L[A]) for all ℵ1-sized sets of reals A? Does BPFA?
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